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INTRODUCTION
Danielle Bimber (“Bimber”), a twenty-nine-year-old married mother
of three from Pennsylvania, gave birth again in November 2003 to
triplets.1 Bimber conceived and carried the children in her womb per
an agreement she had entered into the previous spring with J.F., a
sixty-two-year-old unmarried professor from Ohio.2 Bimber conceived
the triplets via in vitro fertilization,3 using sperm from J.F. and an

1. See John Horton, Legal Fight Leaves Triplets in Limbo, THE PLAIN DEALER,
July 18, 2004, available at http://www.intendedparents.com/News/Legal_fight_
leaves_triplets_in_limbo.html (noting that Bimber, who did not graduate from
college, divorced her first husband in 2000, is married to her second husband, filed
for bankruptcy in July of 2003, and currently lives in a low-income community).
Bimber attributes her decision to become a surrogate mother to the ease of her past
pregnancies and her sympathy for those who are incapable of having children. Id.
2. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 4 (2004) (stating that Bimber applied to
serve as a surrogate mother online with a group called Surrogate Mothers, Inc.
(“SMI”), which matched her with J.F. and his girlfriend).
3. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational
Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 681 (2000) (explaining that in vitro
fertilization occurs in a Petri dish, after which a doctor implants the resulting embryo
into a woman’s uterus).
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ovum from an egg donor in Texas.4 The agreement between Bimber
and J.F. stipulated that once Bimber had the babies, she would
transfer legal custody of the babies to J.F.5
After the birth of the babies, Bimber had a change of heart and
decided to sue for custody of the triplets in Pennsylvania.6 J.F. argued
that Bimber did not have legal standing to sue for custody because she
was not the children’s legal mother.7 In the case, J.F. v. D.B., the
judge did not have any legal precedent to guide his decision because
Pennsylvania does not have any statutes or case law addressing
gestational surrogacy.8 As a result, the judge relied on contract law
and public policy goals to conclude that Bimber was in fact the
triplets’ legal mother, despite the absence of a genetic relationship.9
Because of this status as their legal mother, Bimber had automatic
standing to seek custody of the triplets.10 This finding is significant
because it gave J.F., the genetic and intended father, and Bimber, a
gestational surrogate, equal status in seeking custody of the
children.11
4. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4 n.4 (noting that the egg donor was not a party
to the matter because she was like a sperm donor, who courts often recognize as
having forfeited their parental rights to any child resulting from his donation).
5. See Lillian Thomas, Triplets’ Surrogate Mom Fights to Keep Baby Boys,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 2004, available at http://www.surrogacylaw.net/
acrobatfiles/triplets-surrogate.PDF (stating that, after the birth, Bimber anticipated
returning home without the babies).
6. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 7-8 (noting that Bimber did not attempt to
rescind her agreement until she became concerned about the intended parents’
apparent lack of interest in the triplets during the six days following their birth).
7. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (declaring
that only individuals with a prima facie right to custody of a child, such as legal
parents, have standing to sue for custody).
8. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 12-13 (relying on the legislative histories of
Pennsylvania bills that failed to become law to infer that the state prefers for courts to
identify the surrogate mother as the legal mother in cases where the surrogacy
contract was void).
9. See id. at 22-24 (finding that in the absence of any competing claims of
motherhood, Bimber’s actions of conceiving, carrying, and caring for the children
since birth established her status as their legal mother).
10. See id. (noting the possibility that even if the court ruled that Bimber was not
the triplets’ legal mother, she still might have had standing to sue for custody under
the legal doctrine of in loco parentis); see also Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d
270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (finding that in loco parentis confers the legal rights
and responsibilities of a legal parent on a third party who has intentionally assumed
the obligations of parenthood in relation to that child); Barbara White Stack,
Surrogate Mother Gets Custody of [Three], PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 2005,
at *1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05008/439189.stm (noting that
when the custody dispute occurred, the Judge did, in fact, award custody to Bimber).
11. See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 637 (Pa.
1977) (declaring that Pennsylvania courts decide custody disputes between two legal
parents by looking solely at which custody scenario serves the best interests of the
child); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (indicating that in
a custody dispute between a parent in loco parentis and a legal parent, the court
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This Comment argues that the outcome of the Bimber case does
not indicate a preference for a gestational motherhood standard in
surrogacy cases in Pennsylvania. Part I explains gestational surrogacy,
beginning in Part IA with a brief overview of the three most
prominent parentage standards that courts have applied to determine
legal parentage in gestational surrogacy cases. Part IB highlights the
various approaches state legislatures have adopted in addressing
gestational surrogacy arrangements. Part IC examines existing
parentage doctrines in Pennsylvania. Next, Part II argues that
applying a gestational motherhood standard in surrogacy cases in
Pennsylvania would conflict with the language of J.F., existing
Pennsylvania parentage laws, and the United States Constitution. Part
III recommends a legislative course of action for Pennsylvania by
comparing Pennsylvania’s needs with the Uniform Parentage Act and
statutes from other states.
This Comment concludes that
Pennsylvania should adopt a parentage standard that favors intended
parents in gestational surrogacy situations.
I. BACKGROUND
There are two distinct types of surrogacy arrangements.12 The first,
referred to as “traditional surrogacy,” exists when a woman
(“surrogate”) contracts with a couple (“intended parents”) to become
pregnant through artificial insemination and the use of her own
egg.13 By contrast, in gestational surrogacy arrangements, the
surrogate is not genetically related to the child.14 Instead, the
surrogate becomes pregnant via in vitro fertilization using another
woman’s egg.15 Typically, the intended parents provide the egg and

considers the parent in loco parentis a non-parent). A non-parent must meet a
higher burden of proof to gain custody because the courts favor placing children with
legal parents (who are also, in most cases, biological parents). Id.
12. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 109 (1995) (noting that advancements in
reproductive technology have made gestational surrogacy possible and have created
an attractive alternative to traditional surrogacy).
13. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 603-04 (2002)
(identifying the distinguishing factor between traditional and gestational surrogacy as
the surrogate’s use of her own egg).
14. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 60 (1994) (defining a “genetic
relationship” as one involving individuals who share blood derived from a common
ancestor).
15. See Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze
of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 131-32 (2000) (asserting that infertility
renders over six million women of childbearing age incapable of carrying a child to
term and reporting that gestational surrogacy is becoming a popular solution for
many of those women).
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sperm.16 Sometimes intended parents may use donor eggs and/or
sperm, which can result in as many as five individuals contributing to
the creation of the child.17 With the role of parent divided among so
many parties,18 courts often struggle to identify new standards of legal
parentage that can address these confusing possibilities.19 Thus far,
courts have applied three different approaches.20
A. The Judicial Response to Surrogacy: Three Standards to
Determine Legal Parentage in Gestational Surrogacy Situations
1. The Legacy of In re Baby M.: A Gestational Motherhood Standard
In 1989, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Baby M., the
first major case concerning surrogacy contracts, and laid the
foundation for the first judicial approach to surrogacy.21 The court
voided a traditional surrogacy contract as contrary to public policy,
and declared the surrogate the legal mother of the child she bore.22
More than a decade later, the New Jersey Superior Court applied this
gestational motherhood standard articulated in In re Baby M. to a
gestational surrogacy situation.23
The gestational motherhood
16. See John Dwight Ingram, Surrogate Gestator: A New and Honorable
Profession, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 677 (1993) (explaining that the prospect of
creating a child that is genetically related to one or both parents is what makes
gestational surrogacy so appealing to infertile couples).
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (recognizing legal parentage in the intended parents of a child who a
gestational surrogate conceived using donor sperm and eggs).
18. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 602 (identifying eight potential parents in a
gestational surrogacy situation: the egg donor and her spouse, the sperm donor and
his spouse, the surrogate and her husband, and the intended mother and father).
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (creating an
intent-based test of parentage to “break the tie” between the genetic and gestational
mothers, both of whom had a legal claim to motherhood under California law and
were seeking custody of the child).
20. See generally Valerie L. Baker, Surrogacy: One Physician’s View of the Role of
Law, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 603, 607 (1994) (identifying gestation, genetics, or intention as
three ways to determine legal parenthood). But see Johnson, 851 P.2d at 789
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing for recognition of a fourth standard of parentage,
the “best interest of the child” standard); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 171 (supporting
the recognition of the “best interests of the child” standard of determining
parentage).
21. See 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1989) (settling a custody dispute between a
traditional surrogate and the intended parents).
22. See id. at 1247-50 (equating traditional surrogacy contracts to selling a child,
and finding that such agreements are contrary to the best interests of the mother, the
child, and society).
23. See A.H.W. v. G.B.H., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
(relying on New Jersey’s adoption statute to conclude that the gestational and legal
mother cannot surrender her parental rights until seventy-two hours after the birth).
However, the court also noted that because the state allows five days for completion of
the birth certificate, the intended parents’ names can appear on the birth certificate
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standard states that any woman who gestates and gives birth to a child
is that child’s legal mother, regardless of whether she is also the
child’s genetic mother.24 Proponents of this standard typically rely on
both the traditional notions of motherhood and the significance of
the gestational mother’s contribution to the fetus growing inside her
to justify the gestational surrogate’s claim to motherhood.25
2. The Johnson v. Calvert Intent-Based Approach to Parentage
In 1993, the California Supreme Court articulated a new, intentbased standard of parentage in Johnson v. Calvert.26 This standard
considers the couple who initiated the creation of a child, the
“intended parents,” to be that child’s legal parents.27 However, as
originally articulated in Johnson, intent alone did not govern.28
Instead, the court ruled that when more than one woman has a valid
claim of motherhood under California law the intent element
“break[s] the tie” between the two women.29
However, a California court has since found a valid claim of
motherhood in an intended mother who neither supplied genetic
material, nor gave birth to the child.30 Although, in that case, the
intended mother was the only party seeking custody of the child, the
if they complete it after the seventy-two hours have passed. Id.
24. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood
in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 524-25 (1996)
(arguing that despite the continued support of some commentators, the gestational
motherhood standard is outdated because it limits the reproductive choices available
to infertile couples).
25. See A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953 (claiming that a gestational mother “contributes
an endocrine cascade that determines how the child will grow, when its cells will
divide and differentiate in the womb, and how the child will appear and function for
the rest of its life”).
26. See 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that in order to apply the intent
test, the two women involved must have statutorily recognized claims to
motherhood). But see John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”?
The Claims of Biology as a Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 414 (1991)
(advocating a pure intention test that determines parentage based solely on who
conceptualized and implemented the procreation from the outset).
27. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 140 (noting that while courts apply contract law
principles in the intent-based parentage analysis, their true concern is not adherence
to contract law, but identifying the factors that motivated the creation of the child).
28. See 851 P.2d at 781 (arriving at the intent test only after analyzing both the
birth mother’s and the genetic mother’s claims to maternity and finding them both
valid).
29. See id. at 782 (finding that, under California law, motherhood can be
established by either giving birth to a child or by supplying the genetic material for
that child). When different women perform these two functions, the one who
intended to create the child is that child’s legal mother. Id.
30. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(invoking an artificial insemination statute that declared a husband the legal father of
children born to his artificially inseminated wife because of his consent to the medical
procedure and applying it to a gestational surrogacy situation).
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court still had to circumvent the “tie breaker” rule to arrive at her
status as legal mother.31 Therefore, as applied, the test appears to be
one of pure intention that confers parental rights on parties who
affirmatively seek to create a child.
3. The Belsito v. Clark Genetic Provider Standard
The Ohio Supreme Court articulated the final judicial approach to
gestational surrogacy disputes in Belsito v. Clark, in holding that the
legal and natural parents of a child born to a gestational surrogate
were those who had provided the genetic material for that child.32
The court relied heavily on the historic notion that parentage stems
from a “common ancestry of genetic traits.”33 In addition, the court
found that the genetic provider standard of parentage was ultimately
easier to apply, more aligned with public policy concerns, and more
respectful of the rights of a genetic provider than the intent test.34
However, because the surrogate did not seek custody, the court did
not address the more complex gestational surrogacy questions that
the genetic provider test would fail to resolve.35
B. The Legislative Response to Surrogacy
Despite these complicated arrangements, many state legislatures,
including Pennsylvania’s, have failed to address the gestational
surrogacy situation.36 The states that have enacted surrogacy statutes
31. See id. at 288-89 (finding the legal mother to be the woman who intended to
bring about the creation of the child even though she was not the child’s gestational
or genetic mother). But see Storrow, supra note 13, at 621 (arguing that the analogy
the Buzzanca court drew between artificial insemination and intended parenthood is
“strained” and future courts are unlikely to apply it because society and the law both
view gestation as more emotionally involved and more complicated than sperm
donation).
32. See 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 66 (1994) (concluding that under Ohio law, the
genetic providers would be the legal parents of any child produced by their genetic
material unless they have waived their parental rights). In this case, the genetic and
intended parents sought a declaratory judgment that they were the legal parents of
the child and would be listed on the birth certificate, contrary to existing Ohio law.
Id. The surrogate did not contest and did not seek custody. Id.
33. See id. at 64 (relying on societal precedent to adopt the genetic provider
standard of parentage in gestational surrogacy cases).
34. See id. at 62-63 (identifying the relevant public policy concerns as prohibiting
the forced surrender of parental rights and preserving adoption law guidelines). The
relevant adoption statutes include the mandatory waiting period before a birth
mother can relinquish parental rights and court approval of prospective parents. Id.
35. See id. at 65 (noting that under the genetic provider test, the outcome of
custody disputes in surrogacy arrangements that involve donated eggs and sperm
remains uncertain because the genetic providers may maintain anonymity).
36. See J.F. v. D.B, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 13 (2004) (stating that nineteen states lack
surrogacy laws); see also Alice Hofheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling
State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 584
(1992) (attributing the absence of statutes dealing with surrogacy in these states to
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have taken a variety of approaches.37
Several states have adopted laws declaring surrogacy contracts
unenforceable.38 Most of these statutes do not differentiate between
traditional and gestational surrogacy arrangements.39 However,
declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable does not stop surrogacy
arrangements from occurring; it merely creates a presumption of
maternity in the birth mother.40 In an effort to prevent surrogacy
arrangements from occurring altogether, Michigan enacted a
surrogacy statute that criminalizes participation in surrogacy
arrangements that compensate the surrogate in excess of expenses
incurred.41
Some states take a more flexible approach to surrogacy laws by
enacting statutes that permit enforcement of surrogacy contracts that
adhere to certain guidelines. For example, some states prohibit
payment to the surrogate in excess of expenses incurred,42 some
require medical validation of the intended mother’s inability to
gestate a child,43 and still others require the intended parents to
obtain a mandatory pre-birth court order.44
the “simple certainty of unitary motherhood” that existed prior to the advent of in
vitro fertilization).
37. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (describing these various
approaches to surrogacy regulation and citing laws from several states); see also Sara
K. Alexander, Who Is Georgia’s Mother? Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for
Georgia’s Legislature, 38 GA. L. REV. 395, 398 (2003) (explaining that, unless
Congress passes national legislation regulating surrogacy arrangements, the states
have complete autonomy to regulate the issue).
38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2004) (prohibiting surrogacy
arrangements and granting custody of a child born by a surrogate to the surrogate);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2004) (holding surrogate agreements void as
“against public policy”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122, 123 (Gould 2004) (providing for
civil penalties if parties enter into surrogacy contracts); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204
(1999) (declaring that any woman acting as a surrogate is the legal mother of any
child born to her).
39. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 3, at 686 (identifying Florida, New
Hampshire, and Virginia as the only three states to have statutorily distinguished
between gestational and traditional surrogacy).
40. See, e.g., Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(demonstrating that surrogacy arrangements continue to occur in Arizona despite the
existence of a law that prohibits enforcement of surrogacy contracts).
41. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 (West 2004) (assigning penalties of up
to five years in prison for participants in a gestational surrogacy arrangement
involving compensation).
42. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2004) (voiding surrogacy
contracts that provide compensation for a woman’s termination of her parental
rights). But see ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1991) (prohibiting payment in exchange for
placing children up for adoption and stating that the prohibition of payment does
not apply to surrogacy situations).
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2003) (permitting couples to enter into
surrogacy contracts only if the woman is incapable of carrying a child to term or if
doing so would risk the health of mother or child).
44. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2004) (granting the intended parents legal
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Additionally, the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) proposes a
statutory scheme that would hold surrogacy contracts enforceable45 as
long as the intended parents meet certain contractual criteria46 and
acquire court approval of the contract prior to conception.47 Four
states have adopted the newest version of the UPA.48
Finally, Arkansas upholds surrogacy contracts to a degree greater
than all other states. Arkansas is the only state to enforce a surrogacy
contract completely and award legal parentage to one or both
intended parents upon birth of the child.49
C. Pennsylvania: Existing Notions of Parentage that
May Impact the State’s Approach to Surrogacy
Neither Pennsylvania statutes nor caselaw define the term
“mother.”50 As a result, Pennsylvania recognizes any woman who
gives birth as the legal mother of the child she delivers.51 Courts can
vest a birth mother’s maternal rights in another woman only if the
birth mother voluntarily relinquishes those rights or upon a showing
of extreme neglect or wrongdoing.52 Neither mothers nor fathers
parent status as long as at least one parent can prove a genetic tie to the child and
where a court approves the surrogacy contract prior to the child’s birth). Otherwise,
the gestational mother remains the legal mother unless the genetic mother is also the
intended mother, in which case the genetic mother is the legal mother. Id.
45. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360-361
(2000 & Supp. 2004) (expressing concern about laws that render surrogacy contracts
void or unenforceable because they create uncertainty in the legal status of children
born to surrogacy).
46. See id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362 (requiring both an intended mother and
intended father be parties to the contract and reserving the gestational surrogate’s
right to make decisions regarding her health and that of the fetus).
47. See id. § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 365 (attributing the purpose of the court’s preconception order to the state’s interest in ensuring that the parties are well suited to a
gestational surrogacy agreement, that they understand the significance of the
agreement, and that the interests of the child are addressed before conception).
48. See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET (2004), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp
(identifying
Delaware,
Texas,
Washington, and Wyoming as the states that have thus far adopted the 2000 version
of the Uniform Parentage Act).
49. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-10-201 (2003) (declaring that in surrogacy
arrangements, the biological father and the intended mother are the child’s legal
parents if they are married; the biological father alone is the legal parent if
unmarried; and the intended mother is the legal mother if she used anonymouslydonated sperm).
50. See Bahl v. Lambert Farms, Inc., 819 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. 2003) (noting that no
one has ever contested a woman’s parentage in Pennsylvania and, as a result, there
are no maternity counterparts to the paternity statutes).
51. See Hill, supra note 26, at 371 (noting that the presumption of biology grants
legal motherhood to the birth mother in states where no case law or statute exists to
the contrary).
52. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2004) (identifying continued and permanent
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can relinquish their parental rights voluntarily unless another intends
to assume those rights by adoption.53
In stark contrast to Pennsylvania’s approach to maternity, the state’s
determination of paternity does not depend on biology.54 Instead,
Pennsylvania adheres to the “presumption of paternity” doctrine,
which holds that a man is the natural and legal father of any children
born to his wife during their marriage.55 If another man wants to
claim paternity of the child or the existing father wants to deny
paternity, he must show by clear and convincing evidence that, at the
time of conception, the husband did not have access to his wife or was
incapable of procreation.56 Only by demonstrating one of these two
things can an individual rebut the presumption of paternity.57
Therefore, even if another man offers proof that he is the child’s
biological father, Pennsylvania courts will not permit him to assert his
parentage against the husband in an existing marriage.58
In addition, the doctrine of paternity by estoppel applies to
paternity disputes where a child’s mother is not married.59 Paternity
by estoppel prohibits a father from denying his parentage if, after
treating a child like his own, he discovers that another man is actually

incapacity, abuse, and neglect as reasons for termination of parental rights, and
requiring that the court consider the development, physical and emotional needs,
and welfare of the child above all other considerations in deciding whether to
terminate the parent’s rights).
53. See Varner Petition, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 552, 555 (1973) (noting that a parent
may not voluntarily relinquish parental rights unless someone intends to adopt that
child because the court cannot deprive the child of his rights vis-a-vis the parent).
54. See, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions,
10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 76 (2000) (asserting that the paternity presumptions
actually ignore biological facts in order to protect rigid social values).
55. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (noting that the purpose of
the presumption of paternity doctrine is to protect the sanctity of the family unit and,
where that unit does not exist, there is no justification for its application).
56. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 n.4 (Pa. 1997) (defining the “no
access” doctrine as the inability of the husband to have sexual relations with his wife);
see also Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 626-27 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975) (declaring that courts can admit the testimony of the husband and wife as
evidence of “no access”).
57. See Woy v. Woy, 663 A.2d 759, 760-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that
where a married woman engaged in an extramarital affair and became pregnant, her
extramarital boyfriend could not assert paternity because he failed to overcome the
presumption of paternity even where he proved that the wife resided with him at the
time of conception).
58. See John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1388 (Pa. 1990) (declaring that
genetic testing could not overcome the presumption of paternity when the third
party, who was seeking to establish paternity, failed to prove that the husband had no
access to his wife or was biologically incapable of fathering the child).
59. See Fish, 741 A.2d at 724 (justifying application of paternity by estoppel on
the child’s interest in knowing the identity of his parents and avoiding the pain of
discovering that someone believed to be his father is not his father).
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the child’s biological father.60 The doctrine applies any time a man
acts as a father to a child and holds that child out as his own,
regardless of whether or not the father is aware that he is not the
child’s biological father.61 However, despite these paternity policies
that disregard biology, Pennsylvania courts accept the existence of a
genetic relationship as proof of paternity when a child is born to an
unmarried mother and no father is present.62
Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have conferred some parental
rights, namely the right to seek custody or visitation, to third parties
standing in loco parentis.63 Courts permit third parties to intrude on
the rights of natural parents when the third party’s actions create a
relationship with a child that is sufficient to warrant visitation or
custody rights.64 Recently, courts have applied this doctrine to
establish visitation and custody rights for gay and lesbian partners.65
Finally, although Pennsylvania has no laws concerning surrogacy,
the Department of Health has adopted a gestational surrogacy
policy.66 The policy permits hospitals to issue a child’s birth
certificate bearing the names of the intended parents.67 However, the
60. See id. (finding that paternity by estoppel also holds a mother to her own
actions regarding the paternity of a child by precluding her from challenging the
paternity of the man she has held out as the child’s father or seeking to establish
paternity in another man).
61. See J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1, 3-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (precluding a father from
denying paternity where he believed he was the child’s biological father for eight
years and, after learning the truth, continued to act as the father of the child). But
see Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (permitting a father to
deny parentage where a mother fraudulently told him that he was the child’s father
and the father could prove that he would have ceased to act as a father to the child
had he known the truth).
62. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4343 (2004) (stating that at the request of any party
to an action to establish paternity, the court can order genetic testing to establish
paternity).
63. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (explaining in loco parentis
and the elevated burden of proof a non-parent must meet to receive custody over the
claims of a parent).
64. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding
that a third party had standing in loco parentis where she consented to the
pregnancy, participated in the pregnancy beginning immediately after conception,
lived with the child after birth, and acted as a parenting partner to the child’s
mother).
65. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding that the
birth mother’s lesbian lover had standing to seek custody based on her actions in loco
parentis).
66. See PA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR ASSISTED CONCEPTION
BIRTH REGISTRATIONS (2003) [hereinafter PA. SURROGACY POL’Y] (on file with author)
(explaining that the intended parents must complete the assisted birth form and take
it to a judge who, if willing, will sign the order and send it to the Division of Vital
Records so that all certified copies of the birth certificate will reflect the intended
parents’ legal parentage).
67. See id. (indicating that the intended parents are the mother and father who
will have legal custody of the child, regardless of whether the intended parents
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state did not enact this procedure by statute and therefore it is not
binding on the courts.68
II. ANALYSIS
The outcome of J.F. appears to establish a preference for a
gestational motherhood standard in Pennsylvania because the court
held that the gestational surrogate was the triplets’ legal mother.69
However, the court’s analysis, existing parentage constructs, and
constitutional scrutiny all pose problems to that interpretation of the
case’s outcome.70 In fact, a much stronger case exists for arguing that
the court’s application of law and public policy actually comports with
adoption of an “intended parents” standard.71
A. The Court’s Reliance on Contract Terms Demonstrates that a
Gestational Motherhood Standard in Pennsylvania Would
Violate the Court’s Desire to Recognize the Intended
Parents as Legal Parents Where Possible
The court’s reliance on contract law principles in J.F. strongly
contradicts any interpretation of the outcome that would encourage
adoption of a gestational motherhood standard.72 In surrogacy
situations, when courts apply a gestational motherhood standard of
parentage, the contract terms are irrelevant.73 The state relies on its
presumptive standards of motherhood and thereby renounces the
contract terms.74
donated genetic material for the child).
68. See Lawrence Kalikow, Esq., Surrogacy and the Law of Pennsylvania (Apr.
1999), available at http://www.opts.com/penn.htm (observing that despite the fact
that the courts are not bound to approve this procedure, judges in fifteen counties
have issued the requisite pre-birth orders).
69. See Christopher Lilienthal, Surrogate Wins Standing in Erie Custody Dispute:
Contract to Carry Children Rejected on Policy Grounds, PA. L. WKLY., May 5, 2004, at
*1 (quoting Pittsburgh attorney Thomas M. Mulroy as suggesting that the birth
mother is presumptively entitled to custody of the triplets).
70. See id. (noting that attorney Mark Momjian speculated whether the outcome
would have differed if J.F.’s girlfriend had donated her own eggs or if J.F. had been
married).
71. See id. (quoting Pennsylvania surrogacy law attorney Lawrence Kalikow as
suggesting that because of the unusual facts of the case, it likely will have little
precedential value).
72. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 17-19 (2004) (analyzing the surrogacy
contract, and noting that problems in the contract and the contract’s failure to
identify the triplets’ legal mother posed a barrier to enforcement of the contract).
73. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation:
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 271-72
(1995) (noting that the gestational standard of maternity arises from the historically
strong presumption of maternity and that this precludes the contractually recognized
mother from any claim to maternity).
74. See Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New
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In J.F., although the court named the surrogate as the triplets’ legal
mother, it did not renounce the contract.75 In fact, the court closely
inspected the contract terms and, pursuant to the contract, identified
J.F. as the triplets’ legal father.76 One can reconcile this apparent
inconsistency by interpreting the court’s decision as favoring an
“intended parents” standard.77
First, the “intended parents” standard is the only surrogate
parentage standard that looks to the contract as evidence of
parentage.78 In this respect, the court’s analysis comports with the
“intended parents” standard.79 Furthermore, while the court voided
the contract in J.F. as contrary to public policy, it did not hold all
surrogacy contracts void as contrary to public policy.80 Holding so
probably would have created a bias in favor of the gestational or
genetic mother, because courts would not feel at liberty to rely on a
prohibited contract to prove intent.81 The court, therefore, declined
the simplest and most direct method of creating a gestational
standard.82
Instead, the court invalidated the contract in J.F. because it
contained one fatal flaw—it failed to identify the triplets’ legal

Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 202 (1986) (arguing that once the
embryo is implanted in the surrogate, a surrogate’s fundamental right to privacy
shields the pregnancy and resulting child from the contract requirements).
75. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 17 (opting to look at and analyze the contract
terms).
76. See id. at 18 (noting that J.F. is, by contract, the children’s father and legally
responsible for the children unless a paternity test proves that they are not his).
77. See John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1385-89 (Pa. 1990) (demonstrating
that where a married woman gives birth to the child, her husband is the presumptive
father of the child, and only by proving the husband’s non-access or infertility can a
third party overcome that presumption). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v.
Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 626-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (announcing that a wife’s
testimony can serve as evidence of non-access).
78. See Hill, supra note 26, at 415-16 (arguing for application of a parentage
standard that relies on contract principles and holds participating parties to their
promises because the intended parents rely to their financial and emotional
detriment on the promises of the surrogate).
79. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 17 (describing the contract terms).
80. See id. at 33 (voiding one surrogacy contract as contrary to a public policy
concern that requires two identifiable parents for each child).
81. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting that, even where a court declines to specifically enforce a surrogacy contract,
the parentage claim of the intended parents still relies on the intent expressed in the
contract); see also Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 140-41 (arguing that courts do not
necessarily look to the specific contract terms as much as they look to the contract for
evidence of preconception intent).
82. Cf. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1989) (voiding the surrogacy
contract and declaring that in all birth situations the woman who gives birth is the
legal mother).
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mother.83 Had the contract named a legal mother, the surrogate
would never have had any rights to “bargain away.”84 Therefore, the
court would have been unable to invalidate the contract on the
grounds that permitting a parent to bargain away her parental rights
was contrary to public policy.85
The public policy rationale behind prohibiting a parent to bargain
away his or her parental rights is that doing so denies the child his or
her right to seek parental custody or support from two individuals.86
Pennsylvania courts have, however, permitted the enforcement of
contracts that release a parent from his or her parental obligations
when the contract “is fair and reasonable, made without fraud or
coercion, and without prejudice to the welfare of the child.”87 In
these cases, courts have held that where a natural parent bargains
away his or her parental responsibilities and another contractually
assumes those responsibilities, there is no prejudice to the welfare of
the child.88 Therefore, had the contract in J.F. provided for two
identifiable parents instead of only one, the public policy concern
would not have applied.89
Additionally, the court explicitly identified J.F. as the child’s father
based on the contract terms.90 The court failed to acknowledge any
83. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 19-20 (noting that J.F.’s girlfriend was not a party
to the action because the contract did not name her as legal mother and she was not
genetically related to the children).
84. See id. at 23-24 (declaring Bimber the legal mother only after noting that the
contract failed to identify a legal mother and no other viable claim of motherhood
existed in this particular case).
85. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (declaring
that legal parents have a prima facie right to custody); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993) (noting that where a court identifies the gestational
surrogate as something other than the legal mother, she cannot have the
constitutional rights of a legal mother).
86. See Mallinger v. Mallinger, 175 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (declaring
that courts need not enforce contracts to bargain away child support or custody
obligations because children are not property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 191 cmt. a (1981) (noting that a court will not enforce agreements on
the custody of a child unless the agreement is consistent with the child’s best
interest).
87. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962)
(holding a contract enforceable where a father bargained away his parental duty to
support because the contract provided that the natural mother and a third party
would accept financial responsibility for the child).
88. See id. at 273 (guarding the welfare of the child by explaining that if the two
people who contracted to assume parental responsibilities no longer can provide the
necessary financial support to the child, then the court will revive the natural parent’s
obligations).
89. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4 (noting that Bimber contacted SMI of her own
volition and volunteered her services as a surrogate prior to meeting J.F., which
strongly indicates a lack of coercion or fraud).
90. See id. at 23 (stating that the contract identified J.F. as the legal father of the
triplets, but it left the triplets with no means of identifying a legal mother).
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claim of legal motherhood in favor of Bimber that relied on gestation,
only mentioning her role as gestator in tandem with her role as
nurturer in the days after the babies’ birth.91 This suggests that the
court placed equal emphasis on her roles during the babies’ gestation
and after. Therefore, even though the court named Bimber as the
legal mother, the court’s reliance on the contract terms strongly
indicates that it did not do so solely based on the gestational
motherhood standard or her status as the gestational mother.
B. The State’s “Paramount” Interest: A Gestational
Surrogacy Standard Would Violate Pennsylvania’s Judicially
Recognized Interest in Preserving the Family Unit
1. Application of the Rationale Behind Paternity by Presumption
In J.F., the court noted the relevance of the paternity by estoppel
doctrine without expressly adopting a maternity by estoppel rule.92
However, Pennsylvania courts have noted that the presumption of
paternity supercedes the doctrine of paternity by estoppel; paternity
by estoppel only should apply where the presumption of paternity
cannot.93
Courts have acknowledged that the presumption of paternity is one
of the strongest presumptions in Pennsylvania law due to the
“paramount” state interest in supporting and encouraging the
continuance of stable family units.94 Because the court in J.F. applied
the reasoning of paternity by estoppel, future courts likely would
apply the reasoning behind the state’s stronger paternity doctrine, the
presumption of paternity, where possible.95 Therefore, if J.F. had
been married to his girlfriend, the court likely would not have named
Bimber as the legal mother and would have applied the rationale
behind the paternity presumption to identify the triplets’ mother as
91. See id. at 23-24 (emphasizing that Bimber carried the children in her womb,
took them home, and cared for them after birth).
92. See id. at 21 (noting that if paternity by estoppel exists because a child should
know his father, then the idea that a child should know his mother would also
support a theory of maternity by estoppel).
93. See, e.g., Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa. 1997) (noting that the legal
analysis in paternity cases is twofold: first, the court must look to see if the
presumption of paternity applies and second, if the presumption does not exist or has
been rebutted, the court examines the possibility of paternity by estoppel).
94. See id. at 180 n.7 (stating that the presumed father, the institution of
marriage, and the state of Pennsylvania all have a “paramount” interest in the
continued application of the paternity by estoppel doctrine).
95. See Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 1995) (identifying the
justification for applying paternity by estoppel as “achieving fairness as between the
parents by holding them, both mother and father, to their prior conduct regarding
the paternity of child.” (quoting Gulla v. Fitzpatrick, 596 A.2d 851, 856 (1991))).
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J.F.’s wife.96
Additionally, had the court truly desired to adopt a gestational
surrogacy standard, the court would have named Bimber as the
children’s legal mother and her husband as their father due to the
presumption of paternity.97 Instead, the court first recognized J.F. as
the legal father based on the contract terms and his genetic
contribution, then sought to identify a legal mother.98 The court did
not apply the presumption of paternity to Bimber’s husband, because
it did not recognize her legal status as mother based on her role as
gestator.99 Rather, the court derived her legal status as mother from
principles of estoppel.100 Therefore, the outcome of the court’s
analysis should not be interpreted as establishing a gestational
motherhood standard. Such an interpretation would contradict
Pennsylvania’s “paramount” public policy goals.
Furthermore, not only does application of the presumption of
paternity doctrine indicate that the court did not apply a gestational
motherhood standard, it also supports the adoption of an intended
parents standard.101 The presumption of paternity derives its strength
from Pennsylvania’s interest in preserving existing family units.102
Pennsylvania courts recognize this interest as “paramount” and the
presumption is extremely difficult to overcome.103 Commentators
96. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 24 (asserting that J.F.’s girlfriend could not be
the children’s legal mother because she was not genetically related to them nor was
she married to their father). But see Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (quoting James
H. Richardson, a managing partner at the firm representing J.F. and his girlfriend,
stating that the girlfriend clearly had intended to parent the triplets and had planned
on adopting them).
97. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179 (declaring that in situations where a child is
born into an intact marriage and the marriage remains intact, the presumption of
paternity applies).
98. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 23-24 (stating that the contract clearly provides a
legal father for the triplets, but that the court must determine the identity of the
triplets’ mother).
99. See id. (noting that Bimber’s actions form the basis for her motherhood more
so than her biological connection to them as their surrogate mother).
100. See id. (comparing Bimber’s actions, such as carrying the triplets, birthing
them, and taking them home and caring for them, to similar post-birth actions that
give rise to paternity by estoppel).
101. See Lori Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2344 (1995) (arguing that contract law
principles can “bend to accommodate” intangible interests that come into play in
surrogacy situations).
102. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179 (declaring that the presumption of paternity no
longer applies in situations where the marriage is no longer intact).
103. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining that a person can
defeat the presumption of paternity only by proving that the presumed father did not
have access to his wife at the time of conception or that he was incapable of
procreation). But see Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 182 (Nigro, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
less strict application of the presumption of paternity that would permit rebuttal of
the presumption based on blood test results).
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have noted that one of the weaknesses in a gestational surrogacy
standard is that it recognizes legal parentage in two people who are,
in almost every case, not members of the same family unit.104 In fact,
sometimes they are virtual strangers who may live in different
states.105 When an existing family unit seeks to create a child,
prepares financially and emotionally for the child, and provides a
home for the child, splitting custody between two households would
contradict Pennsylvania’s stated public policy interest in preserving
family units.106 The most direct way to avoid the risk of splitting
custody between two families (which almost always occurs when courts
apply a gestational motherhood standard) is for Pennsylvania to apply
an “intended parents” standard.107
Application of the rationale behind Pennsylvania’s strongest
presumptions indicates that a gestational surrogacy standard would
violate the state’s interests.108 In this case, the court could not apply
the presumption because the intended father was not married.109
Therefore, the court likely would have relied on the presumption to
hold J.F. and his wife, had he been married, as the children’s parents
to keep within the state’s statutory presumptions.110
2. Paternity by Estoppel and In Loco Parentis: Recognition of
Parentage Based on Action Rather Than Biology
A gestational motherhood standard also would run afoul of
Pennsylvania’s application of two additional doctrines, paternity by
104. See Baker, supra note 20, at 608 (noting that conferring parental rights on a
gestational surrogate and a genetic father creates a “confusing situation” that conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent that recognizes the sanctity of the family above the
rights of genetic parents).
105. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 1-6 (explaining that J.F. resides in Ohio, Bimber
resides in Pennsylvania, and that SMI, an Indiana corporation, connected them).
106. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180-81 (failing to recognize non-married couples as
part of a “family unit,” and insisting that if the couple is not married, the presumption
of paternity cannot apply).
107. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1989) (demonstrating that some
courts also may uphold a presumptive father’s contractual promise to rebut the
presumption in surrogacy contracts). The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the
surrogate’s husband’s rebuttal of the presumption and recognized the legal paternity
of the genetic father. Id.
108. See Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 17 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 432, 446-47 (2001) (acknowledging the likelihood that,
where policy deems the gestational mother and biological father as legal parents,
custody battles will ensue and the court will have to decide where the child’s best
interests lie).
109. See supra note 106 (explaining that the presumption of paternity only applies
when an intact marriage exists).
110. See Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (referring to Pennsylvania surrogacy
expert Lawrence Kalikow’s suspicion that the marital status of J.F. and his girlfriend
was a significant factor in the court’s analysis).
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estoppel and in loco parentis, because both of these doctrines focus
on parental actions rather than biology to determine parentage.111
First, the rationale behind paternity by estoppel is not directly
applicable to gestational surrogacy situations because the situations in
which courts apply paternity by estoppel are significantly different
from the facts of a gestational surrogacy dispute.112 In paternity by
estoppel cases, the court prohibits a father, who has developed a
relationship with a child, from denying the rights and responsibilities
arising from that relationship.113 In gestational surrogacy, however,
the court denies intended parents the chance to develop a
relationship with the child by declaring the gestational surrogate the
legal mother.114 However, the rationale behind paternity by estoppel
does not apply in gestational surrogacy situations, because the dispute
in gestational surrogacy arises at the moment the surrogate gives
birth; there is no time for the child to develop expectations or
emotional ties that would cause the child to suffer if severed.115
Paternity by estoppel is relevant, however, as it indicates
Pennsylvania’s willingness to recognize the limitations of biology in
terms of defining parentage.116 This applies to gestational surrogacy
because the intended parents may not have a genetic tie to the child,
but the surrogate will have gestated the child, which creates a
traditionally recognized biological link.117 In other cases, the
111. See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (declaring that
the relationship between in loco parentis and paternity by estoppel is such that where
a third party asserts that she has established a relationship with a child in loco
parentis for the purpose of pursuing custody or visitation, she is thereby estopped
from denying her duty to support the child).
112. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. 1999) (noting that the underlying
concern in paternity by estoppel cases is preventing children from experiencing the
trauma associated with discovering that one “parent” that a child loved, trusted, and
relied upon is not his parent).
113. See id. (estopping a mother from seeking child support from her son’s
biological father where the son continued to believe that her ex-husband was his
father).
114. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding
that, because New Jersey has no statute dealing with maternity and holds surrogacy
contracts unenforceable, the hospital should place the gestational surrogate’s name
on the birth certificate to keep with the state’s maternity laws).
115. See Hill, supra note 26, at 402-03 (arguing that the child suffers no harm
when separated from the gestational surrogate after birth); see also Marsha Garrison,
Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 913 (2000) (asserting that claims of
parentage based on doctrines such as the presumption of paternity and paternity by
estoppel do not apply to the surrogate in gestational surrogacy situations, because she
has not had the time to develop a relationship with the child).
116. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179-80 (Pa. 1997) (holding that paternity
by estoppel prohibits parents from making paternity claims based on biology that
would trump paternity claims based on actions).
117. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 157-58 (noting that the surrogate mother
makes a biological contribution to the child, but recognizing that the strength of the
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intended parents will be the genetic parents of a child, but still will
lack the traditionally recognized “birth” factor.118 In both situations,
the rationale behind paternity by estoppel suggests that Pennsylvania
is prepared to recognize that the actions of the intended parents form
the basis for their parentage.119
Second, the doctrine of in loco parentis also expresses the state’s
readiness to look beyond mere biology to establish parental rights.120
This reflects the court’s recognition of parental rights in individuals
not genetically related to the child.121 Applied to gestational
surrogacy, this willingness to look beyond the out-dated constraints of
biology favors the intended parents.122 In J.F., the judge applied the
doctrine of in loco parentis to Bimber, noting that even if the court
refused to identify her as the triplets’ legal mother, she still would
have had standing in loco parentis to seek custody.123 Because a
parent in loco parentis, by definition, is not a biological parent, this
further establishes that the outcome of this case did not create a
gestational motherhood standard.124
3. Assisted Conception Birth Procedure: Acceptance of an Agency
Policy that Already Recognizes the Rights of Intended Parents
Finally, at least one state agency in Pennsylvania already recognizes
the rights of intended parents.125 Through a Department of Health
contribution is insufficient to establish legal motherhood).
118. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining different
gestational surrogacy arrangements).
119. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (relying on actions rather
than biology to define legal parentage, and prohibiting a man who acted like a father
to a child from denying his paternity).
120. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(acknowledging that courts often find that step-parents have standing in loco parentis
because they develop a parent-like relationship with the child through the course of
living with that child).
121. See Laurence Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty to Support: Beyond the
Biological Tie—But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 20
(2000) (characterizing the in loco parentis relationship as voluntarily created, and
arguing that the existence of a marital tie is insignificant).
122. See J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1322 n.5 (finding that third parties can establish a
relationship in loco parentis in as short a period of time as ten months because it is
relative to the circumstances of the case, such as the amount of time that has passed
since the child’s birth).
123. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 24 (2004) (stating that Bimber likely
would have standing in loco parentis based on her role in gestating and caring for the
triplets).
124. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 1999) (noting that a parent in loco
parentis is someone other than a natural parent who acts in place of a natural
parent).
125. See PA. SURROGACY POL’Y, supra note 66 (noting that the Pennsylvania
Department of Health’s Assisted Birth Policy allows for the placement of the intended
parents’ names on the birth certificate).
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policy, the state permits the Department of Vital Records to issue
birth certificates bearing the names of the intended parents.126 This
program is the most direct evidence so far of the state’s willingness to
recognize parentage based on something other than gestation or
biology, namely intent.127
C. Adoption of a Gestational Motherhood Standard
Would Not Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny
1. Unconstitutionality on Due Process Grounds
Aside from offending Pennsylvania state laws and policy goals, a
gestational motherhood standard in gestational surrogacy cases would
also run contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.128 The Due Process Clause prohibits the government
from arbitrarily infringing upon people’s rights.129 Furthermore, in
interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has classified
certain rights as “fundamental” and afforded those rights a
heightened level of protection from government intrusion.130
One right that the Supreme Court deems fundamental is the right
to privacy.131 While the Court has never defined the outer limits of
this right, the Court has ruled that the right to privacy protects
decisions regarding marriage,132 procreation,133 contraception,134
126. See Letter from Stephen Tompkins, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel,
Pennsylvania Department of Health (Oct. 28, 2004) (on file with author) (asserting
that Pennsylvania courts have issued orders directing Vital Records to recognize
intended parents as the legal parents in 167 gestational surrogacy cases since 1994).
127. But see id. (noting that because the policy is not mandatory, several judges in
various counties refuse to issue the assisted conception birth orders recognizing
intended parents as legal parents on birth certificates).
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the laws).
129. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L., §
14.6 (6th ed. 2000) (explaining the history and significance of the Due Process
Clause).
130. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (defining fundamental rights as
those rights that, if denied, would “violat[e] the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our political and civil institutions” (quoting Hebert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))); see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (declaring freedom of speech a fundamental right); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (identifying the right to privacy as a
fundamental right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639 (1969) (recognizing the
right to travel as a fundamental right).
131. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
132. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that state law
prohibiting interracial marriage violates the right to privacy).
133. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that forced
sterilization violates the fundamental right to procreate).
134. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (declaring that a ban on
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and abortion.135 Evidently, within the right to privacy, courts have
recognized a right to use medical and technological advances to
prevent pregnancy.136 Therefore, it follows that the Court also should
recognize an individual’s right to use similar advances in creating a
pregnancy.137 As one federal district court has noted, “[i]t takes no
great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to
submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than
prevent, pregnancy.”138 Although infertile couples need to take
additional steps in order to become parents such as securing a
medical center, potentially procuring eggs or sperm, and identifying a
surrogate, these steps are simply part of the procreative process that
the right to privacy protects.139 Therefore, the state cannot infringe
on an infertile couple’s right to become parents any more than it can
on a fertile couple’s right to do so.140 Yet, a gestational motherhood
standard would deny infertile couples the opportunity to become
parents by presumptively bestowing their right to legal parentage on
the surrogate and, if married, on her husband.141
In order to infringe on a right that the Court recognizes as
the sale of contraceptives to unmarried couples violates an individual’s right to
privacy).
135. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. See SCOTT RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE
NEW FAMILIES? 16-17 (1994) (recognizing both the freedom to procreate, which
involves birth control decisions made prior to conception, and freedom in
procreation, which involves “pregnancy management decisions,” such as abortion).
137. See id. at 17 (arguing that the broad language that the Supreme Court used in
its decisions such as Eisenstadt supports the argument that these decisions also
protect non-coital reproduction).
138. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (invalidating
an Illinois law that would prohibit one particular type of fertility treatment on the
grounds that the law interfered with the constitutionally protected right to freedom
from government interference in matters of childbearing).
139. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 428 (1983) (arguing that “because
fertile married persons have the right to add children to the family, infertile married
persons must have it as well: a legal distinction based on the natural lottery of physical
equipment is not reasonable”).
140. See RAE, supra note 136, at 18 (arguing that it would constitute discrimination
based on gender if the courts denied infertile couples the same rights afforded fertile
couples).
141. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1289 (D. Utah 2003) (striking down a
statute that declared a gestational surrogate the legal mother of any child born to her
on the grounds that it burdened an infertile woman’s ability to make procreative
choices and thereby infringed on her constitutional right to privacy); see also Gary N.
Skoloff & Edward J. O’Donnell, Is Surrogate Parenting the “Cure” for Society’s
Infertility “Epidemic”?, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 18 (asserting that parentage
statutes that do not address surrogacy arrangements specifically infringe upon the
infertile couple’s constitutional right to procreate).
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fundamental, the state must meet the very high burden of strict
scrutiny.142 To survive strict scrutiny, a state’s regulation must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.143 Therefore,
even if Pennsylvania sought to establish a gestational motherhood
standard, it is doubtful that the state could prove that a gestational
surrogacy standard for motherhood serves a compelling state
interest.144 For example, the state could argue that protecting the
best interests of the child is a sufficiently compelling interest.145
However, it is unlikely that the Court would consider this a
“compelling” interest because there is no identifiable harm in placing
children with intended parents.146 Therefore, the state’s ability to
infringe on parental rights begins only after a court deems that parent
“unfit.”147 It is even less likely that a court would recognize a state’s
interest in protecting the surrogate because adults retain the
responsibility of making their own choices.148 Additionally, a court
likely would not recognize the state’s compelling interest in
protecting the family unit in this context because the government
permits behavior that is at odds with society’s accepted values.149
142. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (stating that
“[w]here there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.”).
143. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a law that prevents people from using birth control pills
or devices is unconstitutional, because the state’s interest in preventing extra-marital
relations is too slight to be considered “compelling” and the law, which also affects
married couples, sweeps too broadly in its prohibition).
144. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 767
(2d ed. 2002) (noting that while the Supreme Court has never defined what criteria
are necessary for an interest to qualify as “compelling,” the Court traditionally has
only recognized interests that are truly vital as sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny).
145. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the state
may infringe on a parent’s right to make decisions regarding his or her child in order
to protect the child’s well being); see also Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151,
1156 (Pa. 2000) (identifying the health and welfare of minors as a compelling state
interest sufficient to overcome the right to privacy in matters of childrearing).
146. See RAE, supra note 136, at 23 (noting the lack of evidence of potential harm
to children resulting from gestational surrogacy situations in which an intended or
genetic mother, rather than a gestational mother, raises the child); see also Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (noting that where a “fit” parent exists, the state
cannot infringe on that parent’s right to make determinations of the child’s best
interests, even if it disagrees with those determinations).
147. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 55
(1994) (distinguishing surrogacy cases from “best interest of the child”
determinations on the ground that the former involve identifying parents while the
latter involve deciding between the desires of two parties with competing interests as
to the child).
148. See RAE, supra note 136, at 19-20 (noting that the state has no responsibility
to protect adults from “the folly of their choices” and no justification for restricting an
adult’s ability to engage in risky behavior).
149. See RICHARD T. HULL, ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 14 (1990) (asserting that the state cannot prevent the exercise of
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Furthermore, arguments for regulating non-coital reproduction on
religious, moral, or societal grounds due to concerns about biology,
technology, or reproduction also would not suffice as a compelling
state interest because, in the case of surrogacy, none of those
concerns are justified by harm to another individual.150 One scholar
has noted that the Supreme Court established, in the same cases that
espouse the existence of a fundamental right to procreate, that the
state’s ability to “enforce or impose morality stops at the threshold of
another person’s fundamental rights.”151
Even if a court recognized the state’s interest as sufficiently
compelling, a gestational motherhood standard is, by no means,
narrowly tailored.152 The gestational mother would be identified as
the legal mother in each and every case, without due regard to which
potential parent would serve the best interests of the child.153
Therefore, a gestational motherhood standard would be
unconstitutional because it would restrict the rights of infertile
couples to engage in procreation in situations where the infertile
couple could better serve the needs of the child than the surrogate.154
2. Unconstitutionality on Equal Protection Grounds
Even if the Court failed to recognize the procreative rights of the
intended parents as a fundamental right, a gestational motherhood
standard in a gestational surrogacy situation likely would still fail
constitutional review on Equal Protection grounds.155 The Equal
rights just because the outcome of the exercise would conflict with recognized social
values).
150. See id. (noting that state concerns that do not pose a tangible threat of harm
to others cannot justify the government’s intrusion on fundamental rights).
151. See id. (arguing that Griswold, Roe v. Wade, and Eisenstadt stand for the
proposition that disagreement with or disapproval of another’s moral choices cannot
justify intrusion on fundamental rights).
152. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 762 (noting that, generally, in order for
a regulation to qualify as “narrowly tailored,” a less restricted means must not exist).
153. See Clapper v. Harvey, 716 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (declaring
that, in making a determination of the best interest of the child, the court must
consider any relevant factors that may affect the child’s physical, intellectual, moral,
and spiritual well being).
154. See HULL, supra note 149, at 14 (asserting that a gestational motherhood
standard may violate the rights of intended couples). The Constitution, however,
may permit certain restrictions on non-coital reproductions, specifically laws that
would require disclosure of the gamete donor’s identity if requested and laws that
would assure “free, informed entry” into reproductive contracts. Id.
155. See infra Part IIC2 (arguing that a gestational motherhood standard in a
gestational surrogacy situation would violate the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that the states cannot deny any person equal
protection of the laws); see also Christina DeJong & Christopher E. Smith, Equal
Protection, Gender, and Justice at the Dawn of a New Century, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
123, 126-29 (1999) (noting that Congress originally passed the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect recently emancipated slaves from racial prejudice, but, in
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Protection Clause requires that courts examine any law that treats
men and women differently under a heightened level of scrutiny,
known as intermediate scrutiny.156 To survive intermediate scrutiny,
the state must prove that the law serves an important governmental
objective and that there is a substantial relation between the law and
that objective.157
A gestational motherhood standard treats men and women who are
similarly situated differently, which triggers an Equal Protection
analysis.158 In traditional birth situations, mothers and fathers are not
similarly situated because of biological differences between the
sexes.159 In contrast, in some gestational surrogacy arrangements
where the intended parents each supply the genetic material for the
child and neither parent bears the child, mothers and fathers are
similarly situated.160 Each parent contributes only genetic material to
the production of an embryo, which a third party gestates.161
recent decades, the Court has expanded the doctrine of Equal Protection to protect
against discrimination based on gender).
156. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a law that prohibited the sale of “near beer” to men under twenty-one and
women under eighteen); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 129, at § 14.3
(explaining that, aside from intermediate scrutiny, which applies to gender-based
distinctions, the Supreme Court has also articulated two other standards of review:
strict scrutiny and rational basis). Strict scrutiny is the most difficult standard to meet
and the Court applies it to laws that draw distinctions based on race or national
origin, whereas the Court applies rational basis review, the lowest standard, to general
economic laws. Id.
157. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-75 (1981) (finding that a law
that required men but not women to register for the draft survived intermediate
scrutiny because the differential treatment of men and women substantially served a
sufficiently important goal—the raising and deploying of armies capable of combat);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-10 (striking down a law that prohibited men under twenty-one
from buying an alcoholic beverage that women under twenty-one could buy because
the differential treatment of men and women was not substantially related to the
state’s goal of improving traffic safety).
158. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 634-35 (suggesting that the genetic provider
standard may also offend the Constitution in states where the presumption of
paternity exists because it would permit genetics to determine motherhood while
genetics could not override the presumption to determine fatherhood).
159. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316
(noting that historically, the act of giving birth provided clear proof of motherhood,
while no similarly conclusive means existed to prove paternity).
160. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning
an Arizona surrogacy statute that deemed the surrogate the legal mother of any child
born to her on Equal Protection grounds because it permitted a genetic father to
rebut the presumption of paternity with proof of genetic relationship, but offered no
rebuttal to a genetic mother); see also Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 597 (arguing that
the Equal Protection Clause is triggered in situations absent pregnancy as the
distinguishing factor between expectant fathers and mothers).
161. See RAE, supra note 136, at 17-18 (noting that in traditional birth situations,
fertile couples are differently situated because fertile women have two aspects of
fertility, the genetic component and the gestational component, while fertile men
have only the genetic component).
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Applying a gestational surrogacy standard in Pennsylvania would
permit a genetic father a slim but legitimate claim of legal parentage
by rebutting the presumption of paternity if the surrogate is
married162 or by establishing paternity based on a genetic relationship
if she is not married.163 However, no such opportunity exists for a
genetic mother to establish legal motherhood as against a gestational
mother.164 Therefore, a gestational motherhood standard, as applied
in Pennsylvania, would treat men and women differently.165
Thus, in order for its surrogacy standard to survive a court’s
heightened scrutiny, Pennsylvania must have an important state
interest that is substantially related to a gestational motherhood
standard.166 Pennsylvania could argue that the state has an important
interest in furthering the bond between gestator and child or that
gestation, rather than genetics, creates motherhood.167 However, the
Supreme Court has adamantly rejected arguments based on sex
stereotyping.168 Since there is no evidence that a child benefits more
from his relationship with a non-genetically-related surrogate than
with his own genetic parents, that justification hinges on sex-based
stereotypes.169 Therefore, a court likely would reject that argument
162. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 n.9 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the
presumption of paternity can be rebutted by proof that the husband had no access to
the wife at the time of conception or that he was infertile); see also Commonwealth
ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (recognizing that
courts can consider the husband’s and wife’s testimonies as to whether or not there
was “access” at the time of conception).
163. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4343 (2004) (stating that genetic testing can
establish paternity if the woman who gives birth is not married and no man has acted
as a father to the child).
164. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (proving that Pennsylvania’s
presumption of maternity is currently irrebuttable).
165. See Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 596-97 (noting that a standard that favors
the gestational mother and the genetic father is discriminatory and requires
heightened scrutiny).
166. See id. (noting that the states that fail to meet the burden of intermediate
scrutiny cannot provide certain rights to genetic fathers and deny those same rights to
genetic mothers).
167. See Garrison, supra note 115, at 914-15 (noting that arguments in favor of
recognizing the legal parentage of a gestational mother do not rest on contract or
procreative liberty analysis; instead, they focus on the significance of the gestational
bond).
168. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (invalidating a
statutory scheme that provided for benefits to all wives of military men, but
conditioned the receipt of benefits by husbands of military women because the law’s
justification rested on stereotypes of the sexes); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15
(1975) (overturning a child support law that required child support payments for
boys until age twenty-one but for women only until eighteen, because the law relied
on sex stereotypes to justify disparate treatment of men and women).
169. See Hill, supra note 26, at 393-94, 403 (noting that, while parental bonding
within the first year is tantamount to a child’s development, research has failed to
show that a child benefits more from bonding with a gestational mother than with a
non-biologically-connected one).
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and find that Pennsylvania lacks an interest sufficiently important and
substantially related to the motherhood standard to overcome the
court’s heightened scrutiny.170 As a result, a gestational motherhood
standard would likely fail Equal Protection analysis.
III. THE FUTURE OF SURROGACY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania should codify its approach to surrogacy contracts in
order to protect the rights of intended parents.171
Some
commentators believe that Pennsylvania’s current system is adequate,
but the emergence and outcome of J.F. suggests otherwise. As it
stands, the state fails to protect the rights of intended parents.172 The
legislature should enact guidelines to govern surrogacy arrangements
and to guide future courts in their surrogacy analyses.173
A. Enactment of a Modified Version of the Uniform Parentage Act
Pennsylvania’s statute should resemble the UPA in several ways.174
First, it should recognize the intended parents as the legal parents of a
child born through a surrogacy arrangement.175 To avoid situations
like that seen in J.F., the statute specifically should require the
identification of two parents.176 However, the statute should differ
from the UPA in that it should recognize intended parents whether or
not the intended parents are married.177 Requiring marriage of
170. See Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 597 (arguing that it would be nearly
impossible for the government to meet the heightened level of scrutiny without
relying on sex stereotyping to justify the disparate treatment of men and women).
171. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 32 (2004) (recommending that the
legislature take action to enact surrogacy legislation and prevent cases like this one
from appearing before the courts).
172. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (noting that because the
legislature has not codified the Department of Health’s assisted birth procedure, it is
not binding on the courts). Although courts can choose to apply it, the Department
of Health cannot require them to do so nor can it require them to uphold its
application during a surrogacy dispute. Id.
173. See Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (acknowledging the assertions of notable
Pennsylvania attorneys that the facts of the Bimber case are such that the case will not
affect the outcome of future surrogacy cases in Pennsylvania).
174. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 prefatory cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
360-61 (2000 & Supp. 2004) (advocating for a law that favors intended parents and
recognizes a surrogacy contract as enforceable as long as a court pre-approves it).
175. See id. § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362 (asserting that, because the advancement of
science virtually guarantees that gestational surrogacy agreements will continue, a
standard that enforces pre-approved surrogacy contracts will promote the public
policy goals of stability and fairness).
176. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 19-23 (refusing to enforce the surrogacy contract
where it only provided for one legal parent of the triplets).
177. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362 (requiring that the
intended parents be married and parties to the contract); see also RAE, supra note
136, at 19 (concluding that there are no compelling reasons to recognize the rights of
procreative freedom only in married couples).
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intended parents would conflict with Pennsylvania’s recent willingness
to circumvent marital requirements in family law issues.178 For
example, Pennsylvania has recognized exceptions to marital
requirements for gay couples, who are not legally permitted to
marry.179 Simply requiring the identification of two parents would
coincide with Pennsylvania’s expanding perception of the “family
unit.”180 Further, this requirement would still protect the rights of
the child because it would ensure two legal parents from whom the
child could seek emotional and financial support.181
Additionally, the Pennsylvania statute should require the receipt of
a pre-conception order recognizing the contract as valid.182 This
would permit the state to safeguard the interest of the child by
predetermining the ability of the parties to fulfill their contractual
roles and obligations.183 It also will deflect arguments centered on
concerns about the rights of the gestational mother.184 The court in
J.F. held that the contract conflicted with public policy because it
allowed Bimber to sign away her parental rights without adequate
178. See generally Maureen Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying to Find a
Pot of Gold for Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 495 (2003)
(noting that while Pennsylvania does not officially recognize same sex unions, some
Pennsylvania courts permit gay couples to avail themselves of family law benefits such
as second-parent adoption, custody and visitation rights, and domestic violence
protection).
179. See In re Adoption of R.B.F, 803 A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002) (permitting
an exception to a statutory requirement that where one person seeks to adopt his or
her domestic partner’s child, the parent and the person who wishes to adopt must be
married to each other). The court permitted a gay male to adopt his partner’s child
because the state prohibited them from marrying, which the court found fell within a
statutory exception involving a showing of “good cause” as to why the adopting
couple had not met the statutory requirements. Id.
180. See Shultz, supra note 159, at 344 (acknowledging the evolution of the
“traditional family unit” due to divorce, remarriage, gay relationships, and unmarried
cohabitation).
181. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 663 (asserting that a marital requirement is
irrelevant because intended parents assume legal obligations to support their child
through their status as legal parents, not through marriage).
182. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 364-65 (noting that the courtapproved pre-conception validation guards the interest of any potential child by
ensuring that intended parents meet the requirements of adoptive parents); see also
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2004) (requiring the court to make twelve independent
findings, including the intended parents’ fitness, prior to issuing the necessary preconception court order).
183. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B) (requiring that the court find that intended
parents meet the standard of fitness required of adoptive parents, that the parties
entered the contract voluntarily, and that the surrogate has endured at least one prior
pregnancy).
184. Cf. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky.
1986) (noting that where a court approves a pre-conception surrogacy contract, the
court will necessarily have concluded that no one induced the surrogate into agreeing
to surrender a child, but instead that the surrogate agreed to conceive and carry a
child for others who will have parental rights).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

27

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5

158

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 14:1

time to consider them.185 However, a court’s validation of a surrogacy
agreement prior to conception will effectively constitute a waiver of
the surrogate’s parental rights.186 Furthermore, a pre-conception
contract will defend against accusations that surrogacy contracts
manipulate or exploit women.187 The pre-conception validation
order also would require the court to conclude that all parties entered
into the contract knowingly and without coercion.188 Such an order
would demonstrate the surrogate’s ability to make knowing and
rational decisions regarding her own body.189
Finally, the UPA also suggests that, where there is no court-validated
surrogacy agreement, traditional parentage statutes should prevail.190
In Pennsylvania, this would result in the court identifying the birth
mother as the legal mother and her husband or the genetic father as
the legal father.191 This would serve to encourage parties to surrogate
agreements to seek court approval and would thereby protect the
interests of all parties.192 In order to bypass any potential Equal
Protection issues, however, the state should enact a maternity law that
would allow a rebuttal of the birth mother presumption.193
185. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 22 (2004) (applying the public policy
concerns behind the creation of mandatory waiting periods in adoption situations).
186. See Alexander, supra note 37, at 425-26 (arguing that a court’s preconception validation prevents the surrogate from ever acquiring rights and thereby
shields her from any existing baby-selling statute).
187. See generally Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist
Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992) (summarizing arguments
against surrogacy that focus on potential harms to the perception of women and to
the feminist movement altogether, and ultimately concluding that a statute should
address these concerns).
188. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(b)(4) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2000
& Supp. 2004) (requiring a court to find that all parties to the contract entered it
freely and knowingly prior to certifying a pre-conception agreement).
189. See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 155-56 (1989)
(asserting that arguments focusing on the surrogate’s welfare and rights ignore
women’s “faculty of self-determination” and their ability to make informed, binding
decisions about their bodies); see also Shultz, supra note 159, at 384 (arguing that if
courts permit surrogates to shirk their contractual obligations, they will reinforce
stereotypes of women as “unstable, as unable to make decisions and stick to them,
and as necessarily vulnerable to their hormones and emotions”).
190. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (indicating that even where
a court finds a contract unenforceable, the intended parents may still be liable for
support of the resulting child).
191. See supra Part IC (explaining that, under Pennsylvania law, a gestational
mother and her husband are the legal parents of a child born to her, and if the
gestational mother is not married, the genetic father has the opportunity to establish
parentage).
192. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362 (noting that even though
this provision does not protect the intended parents, the provision does not prohibit
surrogacy agreements). The UPA seeks only to “regularize the parentage aspects of
the science, not to regulate the practice of assisted reproduction.” Id.
193. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(declaring that where a parentage rebuttal is available to a genetic father but not to a
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B. Rejection of Commodification Concerns
Pennsylvania’s statute should not prohibit payment to the surrogate
for her services.194 States that prohibit payment to the surrogate cite
concerns about baby-selling and commodification.195 Upon closer
examination, permitting payment to surrogates in Pennsylvania would
not conflict with Pennsylvania’s law against baby-selling.196 As
previously mentioned, where a court approves a contract preconception, the surrogate has no right to the child and therefore no
ability to sell the child.197 As a result, the cited concerns do not apply.
Furthermore, the argument against commodification relies on the
notion that there are some goods or services that people should never
exchange for money.198 However, commentator Richard Epstein
dismisses this argument by stating that one person should not impose
his or her moral belief about commodification onto others.199
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the government cannot
justify the passage of laws on morality alone.200
The commodification argument generally rests on the notion that
surrogacy exploits women.201 However, proving exploitation would
require showing that the alleged victims all possessed a particular
genetic mother, the state has violated the Equal Protection Clause).
194. Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(e), 9B U.L.A. 362 (permitting payment to the
surrogate as consideration).
195. See 1980-1981 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 2-588 (1981) (declaring payments to a
surrogate contrary to Kentucky’s strong public policy against the buying and selling of
children).
196. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (2004) (declaring that it is a misdemeanor to
trade, barter, buy, sell, or deal in infant children); see also Ingram, supra note 16, at
682 (explaining that the public policy concern against baby-selling stemmed from
situations in which a single woman found herself unexpectedly pregnant and felt that
she had no choice but to sell her baby).
197. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky.
1986) (distinguishing surrogacy from baby-selling by arguing that baby-selling statutes
protect baby buyers from manipulating vulnerable mothers into surrendering their
children, whereas court approved surrogacy agreements recognize that the surrogate
does not risk such inducement because she has not yet conceived a child).
198. See Alan Wertheimer, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary
Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law: IV. Trans-substantive Themes:
Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215, 1218 (1997)
(indicating that other goods or services to which states have applied the
commodification argument are citizenship, human beings, and marriage rights).
199. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2326 (1995) (dispelling the commodification
argument and advocating for full enforcement of surrogacy contracts).
200. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (acknowledging that the law should protect universal liberties rather than
mandate on the basis of individual moral codes).
201. See Hill, supra note 26, at 409 (noting that a common exploitation argument
rests on the notion that women are somehow not free to make decisions regarding
surrogacy).
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vulnerability that rendered them incapable of turning down the
exploitative offer.202 Women who become surrogates do not possess
the same characteristics and they opt to become surrogates for a
variety of different reasons.203 Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that
all surrogates possess the same vulnerability. Without a shared
vulnerability, surrogacy contracts cannot be exploitative.204 Without
the baby-selling or commodification arguments to support a
restriction on payment to the surrogate, there remains no viable
justification for prohibiting a gestational surrogate from receiving
compensation for her valuable services.205
CONCLUSION
Last year, Pennsylvania courts addressed a gestational surrogacy
dispute for the first time in J.F. v. D.B. This case likely indicates the
increasing popularity of surrogacy arrangements, as well as the need
for guidelines in deciding these disputes. The case possessed a
complicated set of facts and represented the messy disputes that can
arise from gestational surrogacy arrangements. The judge in this case
ultimately ruled that the gestational surrogate was the mother of the
triplets she bore.
However, neither future courts nor the Pennsylvania legislature
should interpret the outcome of J.F. as favoring the adoption of a
gestational motherhood standard for surrogacy situations in
Pennsylvania. The court named Bimber as the legal mother because
of a fatal contract flaw unique to this case, not because of her role as
gestator.
In addition, a gestational motherhood standard in
Pennsylvania would conflict with the existing justifications behind the
state’s paternity laws and existing policies. Furthermore, a gestational
surrogacy standard likely would fail constitutional analysis as applied
in Pennsylvania because it would deny infertile parents their right to
procreate. It also would violate the Equal Protection Clause by
202. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 3, at 689 (noting that commercial
surrogacy contracts are not exploitative because there is no evidence that a surrogacy
contract exploits a given weakness in the surrogate).
203. See HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 5457 (1994) (describing the varying characteristics of surrogates interviewed and noting
that they perceived their choice as an informed one, even where class inequities
existed between intended parents and surrogates).
204. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. Rptr.2d 1993) (acknowledging
an absence of significant data to indicate that surrogacy contracts lead to the
exploitation of women); see also Andrews, supra note 101, at 2349-50 (concluding
after interviewing over eighty parties to surrogacy agreements that the exploitation
concerns were “rashly speculative”).
205. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 689-90 (arguing for compensation to the
surrogate for considerations such as the surrogate’s discomfort, pain, and risk during
pregnancy and birth, as well as the interruption of her own sexual activity).
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denying genetic and intended mothers the same rights granted to
genetic and intended fathers.
Pennsylvania should adopt a surrogacy statute to prevent situations
like that in J.F. from occurring in the future. That statute should
recognize intended parents as the legal parents of children born to
surrogacy contracts. However, because the state does have an interest
in protecting the welfare of its children, the legislation should include
specific regulations, such as court approval of pre-conception
agreements. Additionally, the statute should permit payment to the
surrogate for her services.
Ultimately, while J.F. was the first surrogacy case to reach
Pennsylvania courts, it is unlikely that it will be the last.206 Whatever
route the legislature chooses to take, it is vital that Pennsylvania
implement a statute as soon as possible to protect future intended
parents from the heartbreak associated with watching someone else
raise their child.

206. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 675 (noting the increasing popularity of
gestational surrogacy arrangements).
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